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INTRODUCTION
Alternative forms of land tenure influence soil and vegetation protection
incentives faced by agricultural producers. Overgrazing is a common cause of declining
ecological condition on rangeland and pasture (Ellison). Stocking rate, defined as the
number of animals on a given land area for a fixed period of time, is the primary decision
variable management can use to control overgrazing. Profit maximizing stocking rates
may vary depending on the livestock operator’s property rights associated with the land.
Land tenure alternatives impact stocking rate incentives by influencing the livestock
operator’s planning horizon, and/or the cost structure of the grazing enterprise.
Length of the Planning horizon
The length of the planning horizon is often cited as an important factor in the
livestock producer’s incentive to stock appropriately (Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey;
Workman). A relatively short planning horizon may encourage tenants to overstock and
exploit the forage resource for short-term profitability at the expense of long-term pasture
productivity. A short term planning horizon, however, does not guarantee that a tenant
will have an incentive to overgraze a pasture. Grazing studies suggest excessive stocking
can reduce profitability, even in a single year planning period. For example,
Launchbaugh conducted grazing trials near Hays, Kansas and found that light stocking
rates were more profitable than heavy stocking rates. Shoop and McIlvain suggest
producers who overgraze are usually not behaving in their economic self-interest.
Workman suggests overgrazing is usually a result of ignorance and over-optimistic
forage production estimates, and occurs in spite of the profit motive, not because of it.2
Several studies estimating the economic optimal stocking rate, however, suggest
livestock operators periodically have an incentive to deplete or “mine” the forage. Hart et
al. (1988) estimated the profit maximizing stocking rate near Cheyenne, Wyoming,
assuming 1986-87 price/cost conditions, to be 60 to 80% above the SCS (presently
NRCS) recommended level to maintain range condition. Manley et al. reported that
stocking rates higher than the NRCS recommended maintenance level were profitable
during favorable cattle price periods. McCollum et al. found the most profitable stocking
rate under continuous grazing in tallgrass prairie exceeded NRCS recommendations.
These studies used single period models and did not consider the impact of the
current stocking rate decision on future forage production. Evaluating stocking rate
incentives under alternative forms of land tenure requires a model that considers the
decision maker’s relevant planning horizon. Dynamic optimization models consider the
impact of future pasture productivity and profitability by maximizing the sum of the
discounted income stream over the relevant time horizon. Pope and McBryde used a
dynamic optimization model to compare the profitability of systematic overstocking
coupled with periodic re-vegetation treatments to maintaining a sustainable stocking rate.
Optimal stocking rates approached the biological sustainable level as the planning
horizon increased to perpetuity. The grazing strategy that maximized the sum of the
discounted cash flow streams was to slightly overgraze and deplete the forage over a 10-
year planning horizon.
Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey compared optimal stocking and forage utilization rates
for a single period to an extended planning horizon based on Colorado production data
(Sims, Dahl, and Denham.). Profit maximizing stocking rates were slightly lower in the3
dynamic model relative to the myopic model, but were not high enough in either model to
impair forage production. The authors concluded that intertemporal impacts on forage
production were a relatively minor consideration in the current stocking rate decision.
Cost and Revenue Structure
Economically optimal stocking rates are influenced by the cost and revenue
structure of the grazing enterprise. For example, when hides were the principle livestock
product and cattle were sold by the head, livestock producers had and incentive to graze
heavily (Hooper and Heady). In the current system, stocker cattle are typically purchased
by the head and sold by weight, a combination that favors lighter stocking rates.
The method grazing leases are denominated influences the cost structure of the
grazing enterprise, and consequently, profit maximizing stocking rates. For example,
when leases specify compensation on a per acre basis, tenants can reduce per unit costs
by increasing stocking rates. Per acre leases, therefore, encourage tenants to stock heavily
while per head agreements encourage the landowner to stock heavily (Langemeier).
Klipple and Bement suggest per head lease agreements contributes to the historic abuse
of grazing land.
OBJECTIVES
The objective of this study is to explore the relationship between alternative
tenure arrangements commonly applied to grazing land (Langemeier) and economic
optimal stocking rates. Specific objectives are to: (1) estimate optimal stocking rates for
each grazing season between 1975 and 1998 under alternative land tenure arrangements
given price/cost conditions observed in the relevant year; and (2) quantify and compare4
expected returns and relative risks accruing to landowners and tenants under alternative
land tenure arrangements (ie. Time horizon and unit of payment).
METHODS
Nonlinear programming models were used to estimate optimal the stocking rate
each year over a 24 year period under “per acre” and “per head” one, four, eight, and 12-
year lease agreements. The models were designed to represent a tenant under alternative
lease terms and were compared to the results assuming an owner operator over a 24 year
planning horizon. The objective function of each model was specified as follows:
(1) Max Pc = ￿
 
  [HDt * (OSPt * OSWt – MSPt * MSWt – VCHt) / (1 + R)
t]
(2) Max Pk = ￿
 
  [HDt*(OSPt*OSWt–MSPt*MSWt–VCHt–LRHt)/(1+R)t]
(3) Max Pk= ￿
 
  [{HDt*(OSPt*OSWt – MSPt*MSWt – VCHt) –LRAt*640Ac}/(1+R)t]
Stocking rates are constrained by the following equations:
(4) OSWt = MSWt + DOPt * ADGt;
(5) ADGt = 2.450 – 0.0064 * GPt;
(6) GPt = HDt * DOPt/AFt
(7) AFt = FPC * HPIt
(8) HPIt = 0.4343 + 0.5824 HPIt-1 – 0.00136 GPt-1;
Variable names are defined as follows:
Pc = Cumulative pasture profitability over the
24-year time horizon.
Pk= Cumulative pasture profitability over the
length of the lease.
HDt = Number of head per section in year t
MSPt = May steer price in year t
MSWt = May steer weight in year t







OSWt = October steer weight in year t
VCHt = Variable cost per head in year t
LRHt = Lease rate per head in year t
LRAt = Lease rate per acre in year t
R = Discount rate
DOPt = Days on pasture in year t
ADGt = Average daily gain in year t
GPt = Grazing pressure in year t
AFt= Available Forage in year t
FPC = Forage production capacity
HPIt = Herbage production index in year t
Equations 1 to 3 represent the objective functions for the owner operator, per head
lease, and per acre lease models. The decision variable in all models is the number of
head stocked on the pasture each year. Equations 4 through 8 express the relationships
that limit the optimal stocking rate. MSWt and DOPt refer to the May steer weight in year
t and the days on pasture in year t. These terms were constants in the model and the
values were exogenously set at 600 lbs and 150 days.
Equation 5 represents average daily gain in year t. The linear functional form and
equation specification was taken from Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey. Coefficient values
were recalibrated to match weight gains observed at various stocking rates in the Flint
Hills tallgrass region (Smith and Owensby, Launchbaugh and Owensby). A linear
relationship between stocking rate and average daily gain is supported by experimental
research (Hart 1972; Jones and Sandland; Hart 1993; Manley et al.).
Grazing pressure in year t (GPt), expressed in equation 6, is defined as stocker
days per unit of available standing herbage (Hart et al. 1988). Available standing herbage
represented in equation 7 is a function of pasture forage production capacity (FPC) and
the herbage production index in year t (HPIt). Pasture FPC was exogenously assigned the6
equivalent of 3,200 lbs per acre (Launchbaugh and Owensby), which converts to
approximately one animal unit month per acre (Ohlenbusch and Watson).
HPIt, expressed in equation 8, provides a link between past grazing pressure and
current forage production. The functional form and coefficient values were derived from
Torell, Lyon, and Godfrey. HPIt-1 and GPt-1 represent the herbage production index and
grazing pressure in the previous year. Specifying HPIt as a function of the previous year
GP and HPI suggests HPIt is an implicit function of all past GP levels.
Owner Operator Model
Twenty-four years was assumed to approximate the planning horizon faced by an
owner operator. The objective of the owner-operator model was to maximize the
cumulative discounted profitability over the entire planning period.
Owner operators do not face an explicit per head pasture charge in their stocking
decisions. Land costs are typically incurred on a per acre basis but were not included in
the owner operator model, as fixed costs were not relevant in the stocking rate decision.
Lease Models
Equations 2 and 3 represent the objective function of maximizing cumulative
discounted pasture income over the length of the lease, measured in k years. Lease
alternatives defined in the study were one-, four-, eight-, and 12-year per head and per
acre agreements. The model solved for annual stocking rate k years at a time without
considering impacts on future forage production beyond the length of the lease. The lease
rate assigned to each term was the average rate observed over the relevant lease period
reported by Kansas Agricultural Statistics.7
The tenant in the one year per head lease model was able to stock zero head and
avoid paying rent in the years stocking cattle at any level was not profitable due to market
conditions. To maintain consistency between the per head and per acre models, the one
year per acre lease model allowed the tenant to refuse the pasture lease in the years
stocking cattle at any level was not profitable enough to cover per acre rental costs.
In the per head lease scenario, the tenant agreed to pay for a minimum number of
head for the entire term of the lease. The tenant, however, had the option of deviating
from the head guarantee. The number of animals stocked in excess of the head guarantee
was paid for on a per head basis. The head guarantee each year was the reciprocal of the
acreage guarantee reported by Kansas Agricultural Statistics.
Data Sources
All price and cost data were expressed in nominal dollars. Pasture lease rates were
regional historic averages taken from the Bluestem Pasture Report (Kansas Agricultural
Statistics).
May and October Dodge City, Kansas feeder cattle prices from 1975 through
1998 were used to represent incoming and outgoing stocker cattle prices. Calf prices
typically decrease as the weight of the animal increases. This trend, referred to as the
weight price slide, was approximated with a linear interpolation between the 700 and 800
weight prices observed each year.
The operating costs included in the model are normally incurred on a per head
basis. Operating cost estimates were taken from Kansas summer stocker budgets
compiled by Jones and Dhuyvetter and include a charge for interest on purchased
livestock, veterinary care, labor, mineral, and miscellaneous costs. A continuous time8
series operating cost data stream was not available for the relevant time period. Nominal
costs, therefore, were assigned to each year by inflating Jones and Dhuyvetter operating
cost estimates using the producer price index. Interest on purchased livestock was
calculated from operating loan rates observed each year reported by Beshear and Lamb.
RESULTS
Optimal Stocking Rates
Table 1 shows the optimal number of head stocked each year under the owner
operator scenario, per head, and per acre lease agreements. The average number of steers
stocked on the 640 acre pasture in the one-year per head lease scenario was 88 head,
while the solution for the four, eight, 12-year lease agreements were 113, 109, and 108,
respectively. The average number of head stocked by the owner operator was 110. The
per acre lease scenario follows a similar trend at a higher stocking rate. The average
number of steers stocked was 105, 118, 112, and 112 head in the one, four, eight, and 12-
year leases, respectively.
As expected, a per acre lease agreement generated a higher average optimal
stocking rate than the per head lease agreement when the term of the lease was held
constant. Average number of animals stocked in the per acre lease agreement were 17, 5,
3, and 3 head greater than the per head agreement for the one, four, eight, and 12-year
leases, respectively. In several individual years, however, the per head lease agreement
generated a higher stocking rate than the per acre agreement. Lighter optimal stocking
rates observed in individual years in the per acre lease scenario were the result of a
reduced HPI and consequently, lower quantity of available forage. When forage was not
a limiting constraint, per acre leases generated a higher optimal stocking rate.9
An unexpected result from the model was that one-year leases generated a lower
average optimal stocking rate than any of the multi-year leases or the owner operator
scenario. The plausible explanation for this outcome is that a tenant with an annual lease
could avoid pasture rent by not stocking any cattle in years with unfavorable price-cost
margins. Table 1 shows the optimal solution in 9 of the 24 years was zero head if pasture
rent could be avoided in the per acre lease agreement. By contrast, tenants operating
under a long term lease are obligated to pay a minimum annual rent regardless of how
many cattle are stocked, effectively converting the rent payment to a fixed cost for the
duration of the lease. The optimal stocking rate response in this situation was to stock
enough cattle to minimize unrecovered fixed costs. An example of this occurred in 1998,
an adverse buy/sell margin drove the optimal solution to zero head for tenants under a
one-year lease. The optimal solution for the remainder of the land tenure alternatives,
however, was 42 head.
A model solution with zero optimal head may not be realistic. Optimal stocking
rates were substantially higher under the one-year per acre lease agreement than all other
land tenure alternatives when optimal stocking rates were non-zero.  When the years with
zero optimal head were excluded, the average optimal stocking rate in the one-year per
acre lease was 169 head, substantially higher than any of the long-term leases.
These results suggest livestock price-cost margins and the stocking rate weight
gain trade-off carry a larger influence on current optimal stocking rates than impacts on
future forage production. If industry shifts occur that improve the profitability of
livestock grazing, the importance of inter-temporal forage production impacts would
increase.10
Optimal stocking rates decreased slightly as the length of the grazing lease
increased from 4 to 12 years. This trend was accounted for by considering a longer
planning horizon in the stocking rate decision.
An owner-operator faces a cost structure similar to a tenant under a long-term
lease on a per acre basis. Land ownership costs such as interest and property taxes are
paid by the acre and cannot be avoided by destocking pastures during unprofitable years.
Consequently, an owner operator’s optimal stocking rates were similar to those incurred
by a tenant under the eight and 12-year per acre leases.
Vegetative Conditions
Figures 1 and 2 shows the optimal HPI time path for the owner operator and the
tenant under per acre and per head lease agreements. HPI values were used as an
indicator of vegetation conditions under each land tenure alternative. The per head annual
lease agreement maintained the highest average HPI of 0.80. The four-year per acre and
per head leases maintained the lowest average HPI of 0.69 and 0.71, respectively.
Higher average HPI values observed in the one-year lease was a secondary impact
of lower optimal stocking rate imposed by the cost structure. The model suggests pastures
leased with a one-year contract may experience higher vacancy rates because these
pastures were less likely to be leased during periods of unprofitable price/cost conditions.
Higher vacancy rates allowed vegetation conditions to improve relative to pastures leased
on a long-term contract and subjected to grazing every year. This result may not be
realistic. Actual leasing and stocking rate decisions are based on tenant expectations of
forage production and price/cost conditions, which may be over-optimistic.11
The validity of the outcome suggesting one-year leases maintained higher range
condition may depend on other constraints not considered in the model. For example, the
model assumes tenants enjoyed complete autonomy in setting stocking rates. A landlord,
however, would unlikely accept very low stocking rates that occurred during unfavorable
price-cost conditions. The allocation of market power between landlords and tenants
would determine the tenant’s ability to set very low stocking rates and potentially and
alter the relative stocking rate and HPI outcome of one year and multi-year leases.
An objective of this study was to identify differences in a tenant’s incentive to
maintain range condition in a per head relative to a per acre lease agreement. Average
HPI values among per head leases were 2 percentage points higher than HPI values under
per acre leases. This difference was statistically significant using a paired t-test (a =
0.05). Two percentage points on the HPI scale, however, amounts to approximately 70
lbs of forage per acre on Flint hills tallgrass pasture, a negligible value in terms of
ecological condition. The model, therefore, suggests specifying lease payments on a per
acre or per head basis is of minor consequence in terms of maintaining range condition.
Another study objective was to identify the impact of the planning horizon on the
tenant’s incentive to maintain range condition. A paired t test was used to compare HPI
values observed each year under alternative lease lengths. HPI values in one-year leases
were higher on average than all other lease terms. HPI values observed in four year leases
averaged 2 to 3 percentage points higher than HPI values observed in eight and 12-year
leases. While these differences were statistically significant (a = 0.05), actual forage
production differences were less than 50 lbs per acre. No difference was detected in HPI12
values between eight and 12-year leases. The model suggests, therefore, the impact of the
planning horizon on a tenant’s incentive to maintain range condition is relatively minor.
HPI values were highly correlated among lease alternatives. The most correlated
land tenure alternatives were the owner operator and the eight-year per acre lease
agreement, with a correlation coefficient of 0.99. The least correlated land tenure
alternatives were the four-year per head and eight-year per acre lease agreements, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.70. Cases where vegetative conditions improved under one
lease agreement while deteriorating under another were rare. This suggests expected
vegetation condition differences among the land tenure alternatives explored in this study
were small.
Range scientists typically define “proper” stocking rates as a level that will
maintain or improve ecological condition (Ohlenbusch and Watson, White and McGinty,
Launchbaugh and Owensby. By this definition, all land tenure alternatives examined in
this study periodically provided an incentive to overgraze. The land tenure alternative
achieving the lowest observed HPI value was the one-year per acre lease. The minimum
HPI value was 0.55 observed in 1990, suggesting economic optimal stocking rates
reduced forage production to 55% of its capacity. The minimum HPI value achieved by
all land tenure alternatives occurred in 1990-1991. This period represents peak cattle
prices over the period of the study, supporting the conclusion that stocking rates and
subsequent HPI values were primarily driven by livestock prices and production costs.
Expected Income
Table 2 shows the discounted cumulative income generated by each land tenure
alternative. One year leases generated substantially higher tenant income than the multi-13
year leases, with the per head lease slightly higher than the per acre lease. Tenant income
declined sharply as the lease jumped from one to four years, then decreased slightly as
the length of the lease increased between four and 12 years. Per head agreements
generated a slightly higher tenant income than per acre agreements in the one and four-
year leases, while the opposite was true in the eight and 12-year leases.
The drastically higher tenant income observed in the one-year leases was
explained by the greater flexibility in adjusting stocking rates to changing economic
conditions. Tenants in a one-year lease could avoid paying rent when livestock grazing
was not profitable. Multi-year lease agreements required the tenant to pay the lease and
suffer a loss during unprofitable years in order to use the pasture during profitable
price/cost conditions.
The lease alternative generating the highest cumulative discounted landlord
income was the 12-year per acre agreement. One-year leases generated the lowest
cumulative landlord income. The per head lease was slightly more profitable than the per
acre lease in the one-year agreement, but the per acre leases generated substantially more
landlord profits in the four-, eight-, and 12-year agreements.
The model considered the owner operator both the landlord and tenant. A
consistent income comparison between the owner operator and the lease alternatives,
therefore, would combine the landlord and tenant income. The owner operator expected
income exceeded the cumulative combined landlord tenant income observed in any of the
lease alternatives. The lease alternative with the lowest combined tenant landlord income
was the 12-year per head agreement.14
CONCLUSIONS
Results from this study suggest short-term pasture leases do not always promote
substantially heavier stocking rates than long term leases. All land tenure arrangements
examined in this study periodically reached optimal grazing intensities that led to an
inter-temporal reduction in HPI levels. This conclusion is consistent with Torell, Lyon,
and Godfrey suggesting inter-temporal impacts on forage production carry a minor
impact on the current stocking rate decision.
Per head leases generated a higher optimal stocking rate than per acre leases. The
stocking rate difference, however, did not appear large enough to cause a substantial
difference in future forage production.
This study was intended to identify the economic incentives confronting landlords
and tenants, not necessarily describe actual behavior. This model assumes stocking
decisions were made with a full knowledge of costs and livestock prices throughout their
entire planning horizon. Actual behavior depends largely on perceived risks and returns,
which may not be realistic. For example, the length of the lease may impact stocking
rates if a tenant believes heavy stocking in a short term lease is in his/her economic self
interest.
The model did not account for the impact of precipitation and temperature
variation on forage availability. Model results, therefore, should be interpreted as
“holding weather conditions constant.” Actual forage production and vegetation
conditions are impacted the weather. Additional research could focus on how
incorporating weather risk would affect the results.15
This study examines the relationship between historically observed economic
conditions, and the incentive to select stocking rates that maintain or improve ecological
condition. Understanding the economic consequences of various management incentives
is an important component of addressing management-induced pasture deterioration.
These results should be of interest to landlords and tenants, as well as public officials
interested in improving grazing land productivity while reducing the negative impacts
resulting from overgrazing.16
Table 1. Optimal number of head stocked in a full section pasture each year under
alternative land tenure arrangements.
Per Acre Leases         Per Head Leases
Owner-
Operator 1 Year 4 Year 8 Year 12 Year 1 Year 4 Year 8 Year 12 Year
Year ---------------------------------------Head per Section------------------------------------
1975 222 242 226 222 222 174 163 156 156
1976   39    0   50   39   39    9   61   50   49
1977 112 174 133 113 112   91 148 128 127
1978 166 195 196 168 167 150 145 145 145
1979   80 109   72   83   81   73   93   93   90
1980 153 158 150 157 153 134 139 139 139
1981 105 111 111 114 106   89 119 119 111
1982   96    0 112 114   97   75 117 117 101
1983   53    0   52   48   57   35   56   51   61
1984 132 186 134 128 139 114 140 131 145
1985   37    0   67   36   69   28   85   47   88
1986 174 240 205 173 207 178 147 145 148
1987 146 187 124 147 122 146 137 145 135
1988 101 122   96 105   92 103 101 109   97
1989 133 137 136 141 128 121 138 143 132
1990 110 112 124 127 108   91 126 128 111
1991   37    0   36   31   36   15   43   43   43
1992 172 190 172 167 172 146 152 152 152
1993   77    0   90   76   77   43   93   80   80
1994   42    0   84   41   42    0   85   45   45
1995 124 177 123 123 123 105 109 127 127
1996 169 188 169 169 169 138 156 156 156
1997 120    0 120 120 120   66 116 122 122
1998   42    0   42   42   42    0   41   42   42
Average 110 105 118 112 112 88 113 109 10817
Figure 1. Optimal HPI time path comparison of owner operator and per acre lease agreements.






























































































































































































































Table 2. Cumulative discounted income accruing over a 24-year period to tenants and landlords under each land tenure alternative.
Per Acre Agreement Per Head Agreement
1 Year 4 Year 8 Year
12





Cumulative Tenant Income ($) 33,309 14,311 14,654 13,641 36,182 14,984 14,654 13,641
Standard Deviation  2,224   2,586   2,595   2,546   1,890   2,267   2,267   2,545
Cumulative Landlord Income ($) 37,721 62,387 63,108 63,932 38,381 47,891 46,652 47,518
Standard Deviation   1,860   1,673   1,772   1,811   1,548   1,519   1,618   1,668
Combined Income ($) 71,030 76,698 77,762 77,573 74,563 62,875 61,108 60,796 77,981
Standard Deviation   3,502
Cumulative Beef Production (lbs/Acre)      704      897      886      888      775      916      900      904      88819
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